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ABSTRACT
Never in history was art more present everywhere and 
never was it more valuable. Yet, in the wake of Duchamp 
and Warhol, the understanding of what art is and how it 
is recognized is more problematic today than any time in 
history. This paper examines the various approaches to how 
one recognizes a work of art as a work of art. It examines 
the history of aesthetic theory and the variousways art 
was defined. In the end it considers the value of the more 
hermeneutic and holistic interpretations of art put forward 
by Heidegger, Gadamer, Danto and Beuys.
1. Let us begin with a paradox: Never in history was art more 
presenteverywhere and never was it more valuable. Yet the question is 
which values people usually have in mind. A German minister recently 
expressed this very nicely. When his state considered selling a few Warhols 
to fill up its empty coffers, he remarked: “A piece of art has value when 
you can sell it.” It’s that simple, it’s just monetary value.
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On the other hand, I would like to claim that art was never less 
known than today. How can this be? Consider this scene which I witnessed 
not long ago in a famous museum of modern art in Munich: I saw a group 
of people emerging from one of the exhibition halls. Apparently, they 
had just finished their guided tour through the museum and seemed very 
exhausted. They then went straight to a corner where tables and chairs 
had been piled up and wanted to take a rest. Yet before they got there the 
frightened voice of the tour guide was heard telling them to keep away 
from what to everybodylooked as chairs and not to touch these objects. 
So one of the visitors asked with utter surprise: “What, this is art, too?!” 
I think this shows that the identification of art works as such and 
the concept of art in particular have become problematic. It seems that 
whether or not something is a work of art is no longer obvious or visible 
in its appearance. In order to find out what we have before us we first 
need to do some research and enquire into the circumstances of its creation. 
Usually, we rely on the opinion of art consultants and experts, or a whole 
bunch of them, a committee of experts. In other words, one has to be told 
by someonein the know that this particular object is a piece of art. Yet – 
who is an expert and on what grounds?
2. In 1917 it still seemed clear that such a question could be 
answered without much difficulty. And that was just what happened when a 
committee of experts rejected an art work Marcel Duchamp had submittedfor 
the exhibition of the society of independent artists in New York. The 
committee claimed Duchamp’s so-called art work had violated all the 
major rules of art and therefore could not be accepted for the exhibition. 
So apparentlythe knowledge of these rules makes the expert, who in turn 
has to ensure that the rules are respected. What had happened was this:
What Duchamp had submitted as his work of art came in fact from 
a shop of sanitary appliances; it was a urinal. His so-called artwork was 
a simple factory product of a firm called “J. L. Mott Iron Works,” it was 
unaltered by any artistic intervention; and it could not be distinguished 
from the hundreds of other urinals that were available in shops everywhere. 
All Duchamp had done was to give it a title, Fountain, which was 
Gerhold K. Becker   75
certainly funny as it hinted at some deeper meaning. And he signed his 
factory product,but not in his own name, instead he used the pseudonym 
“R. Mutt”, which resembled the name of the manufacturing firm and set 
off much speculation.Yet the members of the jury were not amused and 
rejected it in their capacity as experts of art whose job it was not only to 
evaluate art works but more fundamentally to distinguish art from non-
art. But – to make matters more complicated – Duchamp himself was a 
member of the jury, too, and he had strongly objected to the committee’s 
decision. So, was he no expert?
Later Duchamp explained what for him turned an object of daily 
use into a piece of art: “Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the 
fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it. He took an ordinary 
article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under 
the new title and point of view – created a new thought for that object.” 
In other words, Duchamp’s main intention was to shift the focus 
of art from physical craft to thought and intellectual interpretation. For 
Duchamp it is not so much the physical object that makes it an artwork 
but the thought it evokes. And that is an idea that can be traced back at 
least to Hegel’s aesthetics where it marked a decisive turning point in the 
philosophy of art – as we will see later.
It didn’t take long until in line with Duchamp’s argument, the 
concept of art was extended in such a way that objects like his urinal 
would now be regarded as works of “conceptual art.” He called them 
Ready-mades, and this new art category could accommodate any object 
purchased “as a sculpture already made.” They now include pieces such 
as his Bottle Rack and his Bicycle Wheel and others. 
3. April 21, 1964 marks another key moment in the development 
of the modern concept of art. On this day Andy Warhol opened his second 
exhibition in the New York Stable Gallery in which he had placed 400 
boxes in 2 rooms that seemed to turn the gallery into a ware house. The 
visitors were amused, irritated, and scornful. Although Warhol’s Brillo 
boxes looked exactly like the boxes one would find in shops and real 
warehouses, they were not unaltered factory products like Duchamp’s 
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urinal. Instead they were exact imitations of the original boxes, executed 
on Warhol’s precise orders by a carpenter and then painted like the origi-
nal boxes. Yet for the eye of the beholder they were indistinguishable 
from their originals and without any specific artfulness or originality. 
Nevertheless there was one decisive mark of distinction from real Brillo 
boxes, and that was their location: they were stapled in a gallery and not 
in a warehouse. In this exhibition Warhol clearly drew on one of the most 
enduring conceptions of art but only to call it in doubts, the conception 
that art is the imitation of nature. This tradition goes all the way back 
to Plato and dominated art history until the arrival of photography and 
abstract art in the late 19th century. 
Yet Warhol’s ironic criticism of this powerful tradition gives a new 
twist to the philosophy of art. His boxes are imitations of the ordinary 
factory boxes and not identical with the real ones. But they are completely 
indistinguishable from the real ones and even could be used for the same 
purpose the originals were made for, i. e. to transport goods. This adds a 
new aspect to the development of modern art and gives rise to an interesting 
question, namely: Is art ultimately defined by space? Is it important where 
an object is placed, in a warehouse or in a gallery or a museum? And does 
this location make all the difference between art and non-art?
In fact that is in essence what the institutional theory of art has 
suggested. Since the location where art is found cannot be understood 
outsidea specific social practice and without a specific art theory – and 
that seems obvious when we think about the history of the art museum 
– space may be a decisive criterion for distinguishing art from non-art. 
This is the gist of George Dickie’s argument who is one of the main 
proponents of this theory. He holds that art is defined neither by content 
nor by method nor origin of production but exclusively by the specific 
social practices associated with it. In his highly influential book entitled 
Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, Ithaca/London 1974, he 
writes: “A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set 
of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate 
for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain 
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social institution (the artworld).” Without an artworld with its galleries, 
museums, art journals, auctions, art criticisms etc., art simply doesn’t 
exist. When this artworld places something in a gallery or museum it is 
turned into a piece of art. 
Clearly, this view has much plausibility and requires thorough 
examination. Yet we may also take it as a symptom of the demise of art 
as we know it. It may imply that the concept of art has not only been 
extended but has in fact imploded by its own conceptual weight. And 
the aesthetic conception of art has finally come to its end. And that is 
exactly what Hegel anticipated, albeit from quite a different philosophical 
perspective. In order to fully understand what has happened to art we 
need to reflect on its beginning and embark on a historical exploration 
into the philosophy of art and aesthetics. 
I.
4. On January 17, 1756 an event took place in Rome that was to 
change the traditional perception of art and usher in the era of aesthetics. 
Through the mediation of some influential friends Johan Joachim 
Winckelmannwas invited by Pope Benedict XIV to visit an inner courtyard 
of the Vatican where ancient Greek marble sculptures from the period 
between 350 and 325 BC had been erected which had been discovered 
in the 15th c. One of them was a statue thought to represent the Greek 
god Apollo. When Winckelmann saw it, he was dumbfounded and 
overwhelmed by admiration. Later he summarized what happened to him 
in his book The History of Ancient Art (1764) as follows: “In the presence 
of this wonder of the arts I forget everything, and I myself assume an 
elevated position so as to become worthy of beholding it. My breast seems 
to widen and to rise.” Winckelmann saw in the sculpture both “the god 
and the miracle of ancient art.” He was certain that this statue represented 
“the highest ideal of art among all the works of antiquity.” And for this 
ideal he found expressionin terms that should have the greatest impact on 
the conceptualization of art: “The most excellent characteristic of Greek 
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masterworks is noble simplicityand quiet grandeur (edle Einfalt und stille 
Größe) both in presentation and in expression. As in the depth of the 
ocean the water almost remains calm although it may churn as much as 
it will on the surface, in the same way the statues of the Greeks express 
grand and calm souls in spite of all their passions.”
Winckelmann was no art expert in the modern sense but rather a 
theologian and librarian who was interested in philosophy and classical 
studies. Although he was to become the founding father of archeology, 
in today’s terminology he was an intellectual and an amateur in art. For 
Winckelmann, what distinguished art from everything else was its ability 
to directly speak to the whole person in the encounter and to open both 
their hearts and intellects. Great art causes shock that clearly has religious 
connotations and initiates deep agreement, delight, and appreciation. 
And for Winckelmann it is all too obvious that what causes all this is 
beauty shining through the works of art. Experiencing this beauty doesn’t 
require a theory but rather religious contemplation. In preparing for the 
encounter with art Winckelmann recommended: “First of all enter the 
realm of incorporealbeauty so as to get ready for the contemplation of 
this work of art.”
5. Developing these ideas further, objects of art were thought to 
be beautiful in the emphatic sense of the term as beauty herself is manifest 
in them and at the same time concealed. In art as a sensually accessible 
object beauty reveals itself by pointing beyond the object towards the 
realm of incorporeal beauty. When the modern concept of art emerged 
with Winckelmann, it was still clear that its foundation was beauty and 
that beauty signified not so much an aesthetic but an ontological category. 
By establishing aesthetics as a new philosophical discipline, the 
emphasis was – as indicated in the term – on aisthesis, sensual perception 
as a specific organ of world-disclosure over against reason. The ground for 
this new discipline was laid in 1750 by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 
(1714-1762) who used the term aesthetics for the first time in the title 
of his book that was to gain enormous influence far beyond philosophy. 
It played an important role in Schiller’s letters On the Aesthetic Education 
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of Man (1795) and became the main point of reference for Kant’s third 
critique, the Critique of Judgment (1790).
The perception of art takes place through the senses of which the 
sense of sight is primordial for the search for truth. What lies open before 
the eyes does not seem dubitable but is ‘evident’, obvious, illuminates the 
mind directly, etc. In these and many similar characteristics of sensual 
perception the importance of the sense of sight shines through even in 
modern English, - and even more so in German.
Yet very early philosophy noted that cognitive judgments that are 
exclusively based on sensual evidence can be false. Even as we see the 
sun every day rising in the east and setting in the west, science teaches 
us that in truth this is not so. Although cognition may continue to begin 
with and from the senses, it does not ‘end’ with them but has to transcend 
them towards a theory based on reason, which then becomes the true 
inner light to guide us. This fundamental connection between seeing and 
knowing is still retained in the term ‘theory’ Θεωρια, which has been 
derived from the ancient Greek verb ‘theoran’ ϑεωραν: to see.
I take it that this tells us two things: besides the seeing with the 
eyes of the body there is another kind of seeing that is a spiritual and 
intellectualseeing with the eyes of reason. This Platonic tradition is still 
alive in Winckelmann’s submerging into the realm of incorporeal beauty. 
In Plato’s philosophy this originally religious conception took on an 
ontological dimension and was placed at the very center of philosophy. 
Beauty is an attribute of pure being at the core of all reality that can only 
be approached by the intellect. Yet this beauty is not so much a defining 
characteristic of art but of the appearance of the human being in which 
beauty becomes most visible and can then be imitated in a work of art 
such as Winckelmann’s Apollo. Although this beauty manifests itself 
in the human body, it is above all the human soul where it resides. This 
conception of ontological beauty invites us to an ascending movement 
from things that are beautiful for the eyes to the beauty of being that 
is only dimly perceptible to the soul. In the Symposium Socrates has 
Diotima summarize this grand vision as follows: “one goes always 
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upwards for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things 
and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all 
beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautifulcustoms, and from 
customs to learning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in 
the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the 
end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful (...) If someone got 
to see Beauty itself, absolute, pure, unmixed, not pollutedby human flesh 
or colors, but if he could see the divine Beauty itself in its one form? Do 
you think it would be a poor life for a human being to look there and to 
behold it?” (211-212)
This ontology stands still in the background of medieval philosophy 
and the conviction that more than in art works true beauty is found in the 
beautiful structures and harmonies of the cosmos. It is not in art where 
this beauty shines most significantly but in the world as God’s creation 
whose order signifies the eternal wisdom of God not for the physiological 
eye of the body but for the intellect and the eyes of faith. The order and 
structureof creation can then become the standard by which all art has 
to be evaluated. It is this context we must keep in mind when we try to 
understand Winckelmann’s religious overtones in his art appreciation. 
Great works of art are stepping stones for the imagination towards 
ontological beauty beyond the visible. 
6. In spite of this tradition, the 18th c. marks the beginning of 
what may be called the secularization of beauty. In this process beauty 
is being stripped of its ontological dignity and turned over to aesthetics. 
Yet this produces another kind of paradox, the paradox of art before art. 
What will from now on be regarded as art was for many centuries not art 
but something else, objects of religious worship or rituals for example or 
expression of social standing that had their places in public and private 
life. The modern concept of art is in fact the product of aesthetics projected 
back onto the whole history of humankind, from so-called cave art of 
prehistoric man to the statues as ritual offerings in athletic competitions 
to medieval religious representations of biblical scenes and holy persons 
for worship and ritual. It is noteworthy that – as Paul Oskar Kristeller 
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remarked – no philosopher of antiquity wrote a systematic treatise on the 
fine arts nor attached any importance to them in epistemology. In view 
of the rise of aesthetics in 18th-century Europe Nietzsche recognized that 
its standards were in fact projections onto objects that in their times were 
not regarded as art but had quite different functions: “Winckelmann’s and 
Goethe’s Greeks, Victor Hugo’s Orientals, Wagner’s Edda-personages, 
Walter Scott’s 13th-century Englishmen – one day the whole comedy will 
be revealed. Historically, it was all false beyond measure, - but modern.” 
7. From the perspective of the modern concept of art it is indeed 
astonishing that in Greek antiquity there was no place in the temple 
of muses for the fine arts. Precisely those arts are missing among the 
muses that became the paradigmatic representatives of art in 18th-century 
aesthetics.In the temple of the muses we find neither a muse for painting, 
nor for sculpture, and not even one for architecture. Instead all types of 
poetry have their specific muses. There is a muse for epic poetry, and 
one for comedy, and another for tragedy, and a muse for theatrical dance 
and lyrics. It is therefore hardly surprising that the elevation of painting 
to high art that began in the Italian Renaissance took inspiration from 
poetry and literature in general.  
The aesthetic appreciation of art implied, on the one hand, that 
the temple of the muses be expanded to accommodate the new muses of 
the fine arts and on the other hand, that the ties traditionally linking the 
arts to crafts and sciences be severed. Thus the emergence of aesthetics 
in 18th-century thought laid the ground for the institutions of the museum 
as the specific place for the appreciation of art. The temple of the ancient 
muses was called the museion, which in its secularized form has become 
the modern museum. 
The growing distance to what were previously called the ‘liberal 
arts’ that represented the educational standard of a free man changed the 
ranking of the fine arts from an originally quite inferior status that even 
excluded them from the canon of the liberal arts. They gained their new 
and higher status by proving that they required more than technical skills 
based on rules that could be learned. This led to a new self-understanding 
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and appreciation of the artist as a man of genius and inspiration who 
would do more than imitate nature. 
8. This struggle for artistic recognition is nicely put in Michelangelo’s 
remark: “one paints with the brain not with the hands” [Si pinge col 
cervello, non colla mano]. This remark clearly draws on the powerful 
platonic and neo-platonic traditions that in true art beauty itself becomes 
visible. This beauty is, however, not the aesthetic beauty of the 18th c. but 
the incorporeal beauty of being as such, the beauty of cosmic order, the 
beauty of the ideas. The artists of the Renaissance claimed for themselves 
knowledge of this beauty that they saw hidden in matter, e.g. in the marble, 
and that they had the ability and authority to liberate from its corporeal, 
material confinement. This is the point Michelangelo makes in his famous 
poetic line: “Not even the greatest artist can think of what lies hidden in 
the marble, but only the hand that completely obeys the mind is able to 
reach the image in the stone.”
Non ha l’ottimo artista alcun concettoc’un marmo solo in sé 
non circonscrivacol suo superchio, e solo a quello arrivala man che 
ubbidisce all’intelletto.
Exactly the same idea we find in Plotinos, the 3rd-century AD 
foundingfather of Neo-Platonism. In the section of intellectual beauty in 
his famous Enneads he makes his point with the following illustration: 
“Suppose two blocks of stone lying side by side: one is formed, 
quite untouched by art; the other has been minutely wrought by the 
craftsman’shands into some statue of god or man, a Grace or a Muse, 
or if a human being, not a portrait but a creation in which the sculptor’s 
art has concentratedall loveliness. Now it must be seen that the stone 
thus brought under the artist’s hand to the beauty of form is beautiful not 
as stone but in virtue of the form or idea introduced by the art. This form 
is not in the material; it is in the designer before it ever enters the stone; 
and the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by 
his participation in his art.”  
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Obviously, Michaelangelo was fully aware of this philosophic 
tradition.At the same time, he knew that even an artist of his standing 
needs employment,and in this regard was not much different from any 
artisan or craftsman.In a letter of July 20, 1542 he complained bitterly 
about Pope Paul’s III pushing hard for the completion of the frescos for 
his private chapel while he was similarly pressed by the heirs of Pope 
Julius II to finish the monumentalsculptures for the pope’s sepulchral 
monument. In this context his remark points out that the artist needs to 
have a clear head free from any worries about food and employment and 
free from psychological pressure. 
Yet the remark, however casual it may appear, has a deeper meaningin 
that it claims artistic freedom and autonomy and thus expresses a new self-
understanding of the artist. The artist is about to move out of the shadows 
of the craftsman and employee and to regard himself as someone who is 
exclusively guided by his artistic vision and by his spirit; he himself sets 
the standard and defines the rules. In this way Michelangelo’s remark 
points well beyond its historical context and anticipates the conceptions 
of Romanticism and of the artist as genius (Genieästhetik). This concept 
stands at the center of Kant’s philosophical aesthetics. For Kant great 
art is the work of a genius who produces according to his own ideas and 
without following established rules or standards. He is truly and almost 
divinely creative by producing works never seen before that open up 
new perspectiveson humanity and human self-understanding. Yet he does 
the work of nature by revealing its hidden beauty. Thus the genius is “a 
favorite of nature” through whom “nature sets art its rules” and we must 
be able to regard art as if it were nature. As Gadamer has explained this 
point, the genius places the products of art on a par with natural beauty. 
For “artistic beauty there is no other principle of judgment, no criterion of 
concept and knowledge than that of its suitability to promote the feeling 
of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties. Whether in nature or 
art beauty has the same a priori principle, which lies entirely within 
subjectivity.”3
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9. Let’s pause for a moment and look back on aesthetics. The 
historicaldevelopment of art appreciation shows a deep ambiguity. On 
the one hand, it searches for a common denominator in all works of art, 
for some kind of essence that is identical in all diverse works throughout 
history. This essence was thought to be visible in and represented by 
beauty, in other words: art is beautiful, and that unites all individual 
works of art. In this regard aesthetics educates us to distinguish art from 
non-art by the beauty that shines through them. Beauty is what elevates 
works of art above works of daily necessities, of products of craft and 
of technology. 
Yet on the other hand aesthetics cuts the very ties that bind it to an 
ontological conception of beauty and that dominated the philosophical 
appreciation of art from Plato up to the Middle Ages and beyond. Instead 
the emphasis of modern aesthetics is not on ontological beauty but on 
the experiential appreciation of the individual art lover. In this sense 
modern aesthetics oscillates between essentialist conceptions of art and 
an aesthetic of reception. Beauty is no longer an ontological category but 
– now in the emphatic sense of the term – an aesthetic category; that is 
what I called the secularization of beauty. And as a result art becomes a 
matter of taste. The sense of taste is that specific sensorium by which we 
distinguish, at an exclusively individual level, things we like from those 
we don’t. In 18th-century empiricist philosophy aesthetics is grounded in 
taste, and that means in the senses (aesthesis), and turned into a matter 
of likes and dislikes, or individual preference. And it reduced beauty to a 
matter of subjective delight and pleasurable feelings. Art is what causes 
delight and evokes elevating emotions. 
10. Yet since taste is something private and not a matter of dispute 
and argument, such move seemed to turn art over to subjectivism and 
complete arbitrariness. Empiricists like David Hume were well aware 
of this danger and tried to answer it by pointing to taste as some kind of 
anthropological constant. On this account taste was not simply a subjective 
sensation but a unique form of generalized experience not available to 
reason. As the cook has developed a special sense of taste to examine 
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food, so humans developed a special sensibility for art appreciation that 
sets its own standards. Hume thought that these rules of taste provided 
an almost universal standard for all humanity. If people in fact deviated 
from them, it could only be due to some defect in their physiological 
constitution and the organs of perception. Although the objects we find 
agreeable or ugly must have something that causes such feelings, it was 
clear for Hume that just as sweetness or color are not in the object but in 
their effects on human perception, so it is with beauty: 
[B]eauty like wit, cannot be defin’d, but is discern’d 
only by a taste or sensation, we may conclude, that beauty is 
nothing but a form, which produces pleasure, as deformity 
is a structure of parts, which conveys pain; and since the 
power of producing pain and pleasure make in this manner 
the essence of beauty and deformity, all the effects of these 
qualities must be deriv’d from the sensation.4 
11. Kant, however, did not accept that judgments about art could 
be exclusively based on taste or derived from subjective sensations. For 
him even taste is not anthropologically determined in human nature but 
has evolved in a cultural history of comparable experience. Furthermore 
our judgments about art are usually not merely private statements about 
personal likes and dislikes but intend general approval. When I judge: 
‘This statue or this painting is beautiful’, my judgment has two dimensions. 
On the one hand, it expresses my private taste and appreciation, but on the 
other hand, I expect that others will agree with me and thus my judgment 
claims universal agreement. For Kant judgments about art are neither 
judgments of cognition nor merely matters of individual taste. Aesthetic 
judgments are not scientific in that they add new facts to our knowledge. 
Though they express an individual’s reaction in the encounter with art, 
they are not mere expressions of private feelings of pleasure and delight. 
Instead, they reflect the harmonious state of our cognitive capabilities 
and what Kant interprets as the ‘free play’ between imagination and 
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understanding. Thus the pleasureexperienced in art results from this ‘free 
play’ between our cognitive and imaginative faculties that constitute 
humanity’s intellectual capacities, and for this reason judgements about 
art make general claims. Art doesn’t merely satisfy individual needs nor 
answers to personal preferences; art is not a function of utility. Instead, 
art is ‘free’ in the emphatic sense of the term and without serving specific 
interests. 
These ideas gained great influence on the Romantic Movement 
and equally inspired artists and art critics. They could also explain the 
differencein pleasure and appreciation derived from products of the 
mechanical arts (or factory products for that matter) and those from the 
fine arts. The former satisfy specific needs and the pleasure derived is a 
direct function of their products’ utility. Yet works of art have their own 
incomparable identity and inner perfection. They are not appreciated 
because they are useful but their only ‘usefulness’ lies in the delight and 
pleasure they arouse in the beholder. As Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-1793) 
has pointed out: “In contemplating a beautiful object …I roll the purpose 
back into the object itself: I regard it as something which is completed, 
not in me, but in itself, which therefore constitutes a whole in itself, and 
pleases me for its own sake…Thus the beautiful object affords a higher 
and more disinterested pleasure than the merely useful object” (1785).5 
12. In Hegel’s philosophy, art played an even greater role than 
in Kant. And he rejected its sensualist interpretation as well as Kant’s 
formalismand his appreciation of beauty in nature (Naturschöne) 
over beauty in art (Kunstschöne). Art was now placed firmly within the 
evolution of the human mind and regarded as one of the mind’s highest 
manifestations and as such a representation of the absolute itself. As you will 
recall, philosophy for Hegel redraws the steps of the spirit in and through 
history, from its historical beginnings in Chinese and Indian thought up to 
its modern manifestations and to Hegel’s own philosophy. Art, religion, 
and philosophy are the highest forms of the Spirit’s self-manifestation 
that works in and through history and finally gains self-consciousness 
in humanity. 
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The true origin of art therefore is the self-understanding of man as a 
thinking and spiritual being: “The universal and absolute need from which 
art springs has its origin in the fact that man is a thinking consciousness, 
i. e. that man draws out of himself and puts before himself what he is and 
whatever else is. Things in nature are only immediate and single, while 
man as spirit duplicates himself in that (1) he is as things in nature are, 
but (2) he is just as much for himself; he sees himself, represents himself 
to himself, thinks, and only on the strength of this active placing himself 
before himself is he spirit.”6 (31) 
For this reason Hegel understands the artist neither as a favorite 
or protégé of nature nor as someone who creates unconsciously as if in 
trance. Although all artists need natural talent, their creative process is 
more defined by thought and reflection than by exercise and skill. The 
greatest art is not found in beautiful landscapes or scenes of nature or 
their artistic imitations but in creations of the mind. “The aim of art must 
lie in something still other than the purely mechanical imitation of what 
is there, which in every case can bring to birth only technical tricks, not 
works, of art.” (45) 
As creations of the mind they rank higher than natural beauty and 
its artistic imitations. As Hegel put it in a famous phrase, art represents 
the sensible side of the absolute, it is “the sensual appearance of the Idea” 
(das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee). And that gives art its incomparable 
dignity, but at the same time defines also its limitations. Insofar as 
beauty is revealed in art as a representation of the Spirit, it is the sensual 
appearance of the Spirit that discloses itself in art while at the same 
time retreating from it. Its sensual manifestation attracts and pleases the 
intellect while directing it beyond the sensual forms towards its pure 
manifestation in thought alone. In historical development the forms of 
spiritual manifestation correspond precisely to the evolutionary stages 
of the Spirit’s own development in humanity. Art therefore participates 
in the ascension of mind and spirit that gives all history its teleological 
drive towards ever higher perfection culminating in self-consciousness. 
Art history is not merely some kind of chronologically arranged coming 
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and going of artists and their respective styles but follows its own inner 
logic as the evolution of mind and spirit.
Yet Hegel claims that art has reached its climax and arrived at 
its highest form, while the mind has gone further and has emancipated 
itself from art as its means of self-representation. Although the production 
of art will go on, its purpose and function have changed, since it can no 
longer meet the conditions of spiritual self-awareness and reflection: 
“[I]t is certainly the case that art no longer affords that satisfaction of 
spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in 
it alone (….). The beautiful days of Greek art, like the golden age of the 
later Middle Ages, are gone.” (10) When art is being exposed to thought 
and critical reflection it loses its immediacy and can no longer evoke 
the emotional and intellectual responses of the unmediated encounter. 
“We may well hope that art will always rise higher and come to perfection, 
but the form of art has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit. No 
matter how excellent we find the statues of the Greek gods, no matter 
how we see God, the Father, Christ, and Mary so estimably and perfectly 
portrayed: it is no help; we bow the knee no longer.” (103) In other 
words: “art counts no longer as the highest mode in which truth fashions 
an existence for itself.” 
Consequently the conditions of our present time are 
not favorable to art. It is not, as might be supposed, merely 
that the practicing artist himself is infected by the loud 
voice of reflection all around him and by the opinions and 
judgements on at that have become customary everywhere, 
so that he is misled into introducing more thoughts into 
his work; the point is that our whole spiritual culture is 
of such a kind that he himself stands within the world of 
reflectionand is relations, and could not by any act of will 
and decision abstract himself from it. (10-11)
Gerhold K. Becker   89
II.
1. Needless to say, many have interpreted Hegel’s skeptical 
remarks about art as a pronouncement on the demise of art and its end 
altogether. The continued production of art works was therefore thought 
to represent nothing more than the hollow repetition of experiences 
from the past. When the Nazarenes of the early 19th century attempted 
to subordinate the visual to the conceptual, particularly by placing art 
in the service of religion, they seemed to confirm Hegel’s view. Hegel’s 
aesthetic is, however, largely ambiguous. It presupposes a universal essence 
of art, and charges philosophy with revealing in it the essence of the spirit. 
This process transforms art into a form of self-disclosure of the spirit. As 
such it gave rise to two rather incompatible developments. On the one 
hand it could be claimed that art had indeed come to its end and nothing 
important could be expected from it. On the other hand, art could be seen 
as liberating itself from the fetters of its aesthetic conceptualization and 
gaining a complete new self-understanding.
2. If it is true – as I have tried to show – that our traditional 
conception of art is the product of 18th-century aesthetics, then it is not 
surprising that it should have been based on presuppositions that we no 
longer endorse. As will by now have become clear, by the term “traditional 
aesthetics” I mean something along the lines of William Kennick who 
put it like this: Traditional aesthetics is “that familiar philosophical 
discipline which concerns itself with trying to answer such questions 
as the following: What is Art? What is Beauty? What is the Aesthetic 
Experience? What is the Creative Act? What are the criteria of Aesthetic 
Judgement and Taste? What is the function of Criticism?”7 As the ques-
tion ‘Is this art?’, from which I started my reflections, confirms, art is no 
longer identifiable as the imitation of nature nor as the representation of 
beauty or even of divine perfection. In a time when garbage installations 
can be found in galleries and presented as art works alongside works by 
Praxiteles or Rembrandt, the concept of “art” has changed drastically. 
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The provocation of the new art is caused by its rejection of the 
traditional concept that presupposed that art had to have an essence that 
could be clearly defined and that shines through all of its works regardless 
of historical or cultural contexts. Yet as I tried to show this assumption was 
problematic from the outset as it might exclude works that in other times 
or cultural periods were clearly regarded as art. In our time, however, all 
defining limits have been removed and anything can be declared art. This 
dissolution of boundaries, which has been greeted by many contemporary 
artists as a liberation from the fetters of aesthetics, has, however, also 
been regarded with suspicion as art may become a completely arbitrary 
affair that can include anything and exclude nothing. Something without 
an essence doesn’t have a definition either. 
Definitions of art, however, would presuppose a logically 
homogeneous set of objects whose principle is being sought. Arthur Danto 
compared this endeavor with looking for some kind of species such as 
the species of zebras all of which have something in common that can be 
defined. Yet as Wittgenstein has argued this is not possible for art objects. 
On his view it is as impossible to define art as it is impossible to produce one 
single definition for all the plays and games in the world. In a well-known 
remark he says: “Consider for example the proceedings that we call 
‘games’. I mean board-games, card games, ball-games, Olympic games, 
and so on. What is common to them all? Don’t say: ‘There must be 
something common, or they would not be called ‘games’ – but look and 
see whether there is anything common to all. – For when you look at 
them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.” “I can think of no better 
expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; 
for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross 
in the same way.” 8
Many art critics accepted Wittgenstein’s view and began to search 
for family resemblances in anything that was presented as art. This would 
identify all diverse objects, happenings, performances, actions, and installations 
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as members of one large family, the family of art. Yet as Arthur Danto 
has pointed out, unlike members of natural families art objects lack any 
of the ‘natural’, genetic lines of connections real families have and which 
explain the phenotypical resemblances among them. In the case of art this 
seems not possible and it remains unclear for what traces one should look. 
3. As an alternative, an intuitive approach to art and art objects 
has been suggested by William Kennick. He agrees that art cannot be 
defined and that it would lead to nothing even if it could. It isn’t necessary 
either, since all of us have an intuitive understanding of art. He compares 
this intuition with St. Augustine’s famous remark about time: everybody 
knows what time is as long as he is not asked to provide a definition of it. 
Similarly, “We do know what art is when no one asks us what it is; that 
is, we know quite well how to use the word ‘art’ and the phrase ‘work of 
art’ correctly.” He illustrates this in the following thought experiment: 
“Imagine a very large warehouse filled with all sorts of things – pictures 
of every description, musical scores for symphonies and dances and 
hymns, machines, tools, boats, houses, churches and temples, statues, 
vases, books of poetry and of prose, furniture and clothing, newspapers, 
postage stamps, flowers, trees, stones, musical instruments. Now we 
instruct someone to enter the warehouse and bring out all of the works 
of art it contains. He will be able to do this with reasonable success, 
despite the fact that, as even the aestheticians must admit, he possesses 
no satisfactory definition of Art in terms of some common denominator, 
because no such definition has yet been found.”9
Although Kennick’s thought experiment may appear plausible, it 
doesn’t prove the role of intuition as the sole criterion for recognizing 
art. Being able to pick out some art works from those that are not could 
be the result of training, socialization, or education by which we become 
familiar with the established canons of art appreciation. And as long as this 
canon remains stable and unaffected by cultural revolutions, or paradigm 
shifts in art recognition, it may serve us as a reliable guide in distinguishing 
art from anything else. Yet as Duchamp’s example shows such canon 
and its internalized criteria of art recognition were of little help when he 
revolutionized the art world by claiming art status for his urinal. 
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4. Another option is supplementing it with theory and reflection. 
This alternative can even draw on Hegel’s conception of art as the sensual 
appearance of the idea insofar as it tries to free the idea from its material 
enclosure. Then Hegel’s project would truly have succeeded and the 
borders that separated art from philosophy would have been removed 
completely. On this view art is constituted by theory and reflection that 
alone give meaning to its material realization. In other words, what a 
particular object really is may no longer be found in it as an artistic object 
but only in the reflection of it and accompanying texts. 
For Arnold Gehlen this new conception of art is most obvious 
in abstract art. The arrangement of colors on the canvas appeals as 
much to the senses as it does to the intellect and understanding. Yet the 
intellectual part seems to dominate as this art requires reflection and theory 
to be distinguishablefrom non-art. In this sense art has been transformed 
from something appreciative by and through the senses to something 
for the intellect: for this concept Gehlen coined the term reflective art, 
Reflexionskunst. 
And indeed, if you go to an exhibition of modern art you will 
usually be provided with heavy catalogues and other reading material 
that are supposed to guide your appreciation of the art works on display. 
The implication seems to be that only through reflection, theory, and 
thought can art be identified and distinguished from all the rest. Without 
theory an object all by itself doesn’t reveal its status as a piece of art. Yet 
when this happens and an art work can no longer be recognized as such, 
the traditional concept of art is no longer valid and needs to be replaced. 
For Arthur Danto this implies that art has indeed some kind of 
essence and can be defined. Yet this is not some species nature and gives 
it is content, but is rather formal. He calls it art’s aboutness: all art is about 
something that wouldn’t be there without it. Yet what that is the artwork 
itself can only reveal partially and indirectly; it needs interpretation and 
art theory. Art makes statements about the world, our perception of it, and 
about ourselves, and that gives it its specific character, its ‘aboutness’. 
“To perceive something as art, requires nothing less than an atmosphere 
Gerhold K. Becker   93
of art theory, knowledge of art history. Art is a matter whose existence 
depends on theory.”10 Art shows something that needs our attention and 
interpretation.Usually this has been indicated by the title of a work of 
art. Take for example Breughel’s ‘Fall of Icarus’. Without its defining 
title, which is a piece of additional theoretical information, it would not 
be clear what the painting was about. Although we would expect that it 
is indeed ‘about’ something, the art work as such would not reveal it. 
“Without art theory black paint is merely black paint and nothing else. 
The art world cannot exist without theory, since it is logically dependent 
on theory.” Art works need interpretationin order to be art works. And 
therefore they can be more than appears to the senses when we encounter 
a work of art as sensual object. 
In spite of Wittgenstein’s objection, Danto claims that art has an 
essence and a common denominator and for this reason it can be defined. 
It is its ‘aboutness’. This formal and rather content-less definition of art can 
accommodate all the various traditional views of art as the representation 
of beauty, as the imitation of nature, as expression, as arousing our 
cognitive and imaginative faculties, or as the manifestation of Idea and 
Spirit without claiming exclusivity for any one of them. Instead it integrates 
the process of defining art as a constitutive dimension in the creative process 
of the artist and in the receptive encounter with the art object. This turns art 
into an open-ended process whose only guiding principle is art’s aboutness: 
All art is about something that becomes as it were accessible in its 
physical and sensual realization, instigating an open-ended hermeneutical 
process. While art presupposes art theory, theory can no longer stifle the 
creative process. Danto’s formal definition of art as ‘aboutness’ precludes 
theoreticalinterventions in the artistic process. Anything can be art that 
has been endowed by its creator with meaning and thus sets in motion a 
process of interpretation. 
5. In a similar move both Adorno and Heidegger found the 
defining significance of art in its ability to provoke thought. For Adorno art 
signifies a riddle that sets the intellect to work in trying to unravel it and in 
that way to understand more about itself and the world in which it exists. 
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Works of art “are constitutively in need of a philosophical interpretation 
of the ‘truth-content’”, without resulting in some kind of “explicit, 
propositional judgment.” Yet philosophy “is not to solve the riddle of 
art’s truth-content, but to extrapolate what is insoluble in works of art.” 
“Works of art do not assure us of anything,” and the task of philosophical 
interpretation can only be to “exhibit the way in which they open the 
possibility of the new by implying determinate criticisms on what is and 
has been.”11 In this sense works of art open a utopian perspective that 
enriches our perception of the world and provides a measure of critique 
of the prevailing social conditions of life. 
For Heidegger art has the power to disclose the world and our 
involvement in it. In other words: art is world disclosure. As the world 
is not a given, not an object but rather the horizon within which any 
object can appear, it is not a possible object of knowledge. It can only be 
disclosed indirectly, for example in our moods and emotional responses 
to situations, or by exposing us to the many cultures throughout history 
each of which opens up a world of its own by providing us with a web of 
significations. Art is no longer – as in its aesthetic tradition – understood 
as expressing the artist’s own life that can elicit similar responses in those 
who encounter it, but opening perspectives on our common world. Heidegger 
illustrates this in his famous interpretation of Van Gogh’s painting entitled 
‘A Pair of Shoes’ in which Heidegger recognizes a farmer’s shoes and 
about which he writes: 
A pair of farmer’s shoes and nothing more. And yet. [Ein 
Paar Bauernschuhe und nichts weiter. Und dennoch.] (….) 
From out of the dark opening of the worn insides of the 
shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth… The 
shoes vibrate with the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of 
the ripening grain and the earth’s unexplained self-refusal 
in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.12
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Van Gogh’s painting thus discloses the world of the farmer that 
seems enclosed in it and opens up new avenues of experiencing the world 
in which we live. Art’s power of world-disclosure is intrinsically linked 
to the artwork itself whose truth-content is not found in some abstract 
ideas or philosophical interpretations but in its sensual realization. Truth 
and world-disclosure happen in the specific and concrete of the artwork, 
not in the abstract. Thus art is not simply a vehicle of thought, but its 
truth is embodied in its physical manifestation as this specific work of art. 
6. I conclude my reflections with another defining moment in the 
development of art and its conception. In October 1985, one year before his 
death, Joseph Beuys exhibited an artwork in a London gallery that would 
have seriously challenged Kennick’s intuitive approach. In fact it was an 
art installation that Beuys gave the title ‘Plight’. It stretched over two 
rooms whose walls were completely covered by 284 double-layered felt 
rolls one and a half meters in height. These rolls created a claustrophobic 
atmosphere in which all sound was absorbed. This reinforced the 
impression of being completely isolated from the outside world. In these 
otherwise empty rooms a concert grand piano had been placed together 
with a thermometer and a writing tablet. This installation was later bought 
by the Centre Pompidou in Paris where it is now located. 
Already in 1966 Beuys had created a similar installation in which 
the grand piano too was completely covered in thick felt including the 
closed keyboard. At one side Beuys had stitched in red threads a Swiss 
cross. Visitors reported that the installation initially caused anxiety. The 
disturbance gradually gave way to a more solemn mood when they began 
to understand that this instrument, created to produce sounds of music, 
had been forcibly silenced and turned mute. Apparently Beuys succeeded 
in gradually calming the turmoil of passions his installation had at first 
aroused and in transforming it into a meditative sentiment the longer 
people exposed themselves to the artwork. The soundless and mute piano 
that usually evokes a world of music and happy moments of musical 
performances now aroused feelings of loss and deprivation while at the 
same time provoking a chain of thoughts that almost assumed sensual 
qualities. 
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In an interview at the opening of the exhibition Beuys interpreted 
‘Plight’ as, 
the result of an experiment about a special type of 
laboratory whose purpose it was to extend the bounds of 
art. I draw on the vital human sense of temperature, since I 
reject the materialistic ideology of the fine arts which tends 
to reduce everything to a confrontation between subject 
and object. It is not the business of art to make understand 
something intellectual. Since that can be achieved much 
better by a logical series of propositions. Instead I want 
people to experience the fields of energy by which they 
themselves are constituted. For this purpose I not only 
appeal in my art to visual perception but at the same time 
also to the sense of balance, temperature, smell, emotion. 
It is necessary to insist on touching on all the fundamental 
human faculties: thinking, feeling, willing.13
Clearly, in Beuys and like-minded artists art took a further step 
away from traditional aesthetics towards a holistic experience that only the 
activation of sense and thought together can achieve. While Duchamp had 
a similar agenda that moved the boundaries of art, Beuys was not satisfied 
with simply turning art into thought and thus leaving the dichotomy of 
subject and object, reception and production untouched. For Beuys art 
was not an object but an open-ended holistic experience without barriers 
and exclusions. 
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